Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea Bargaining by Hollander-Blumoff, Rebecca
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, INFORMATION
PROCESSING, AND PLEA BARGAINING
REBECCA HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF*
I. INTRODUCTION
There has never been a shortage of critics of our system of
negotiated justice.' Whether it is too harsh or too lenient,' whether it is
unduly coercive3 or the natural and reasonable outgrowth of a free-
market system,4 whether it overprotects the guilty5 or underprotects the
innocent,' plea bargaining is controversial.' But from all angles, critics
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Bagenstos, Matt Bodie, Sam Buell, Emily Hughes, and Peter Joy for their helpful suggestions
and comments. Thanks also to Andrea Schneider, Michael O'Hear, and all of the
participants in the Marquette Symposium on Criminal Law and Dispute Resolution held at
Marquette University Law School in April 2007.
1. Plea bargaining accounts for the vast majority of outcomes of criminal cases, and,
despite its critics, the process shows no sign of decreasing in importance. Indeed, the
percentage of convictions obtained through a guilty plea increased from eighty-seven to
ninety-six percent between 1990 and 2004. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004 2 (2006), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ bjs/pub/pdf/cfjsO4O4.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 50, 112 (1968) (plea bargaining can be both too harsh and too lenient); Stanley A.
Cohen & Anthony N. Doob, Public Attitudes to Plea Bargaining, 32 CRIM. L.Q. 85, 97 (1989)
(study finding that Canadian public views plea bargaining as producing lower levels of
punishment than criminals deserve).
3. See, e.g., Conrad G. Brunk, The Problem of Voluntariness and Coercion in the
Negotiated Plea, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 527 (1978); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea
Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 14 (1978).
4. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea
Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Plea
Bargaining].
5. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1988
(1992).
6. See, e.g., id. at 1983; Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the
Guilty, 49 J.L. & ECON. 353, 353 (2006).
7. The questions of whether plea bargaining should be abolished or permitted, or
whether it is constitutional or unconstitutional, are outside the scope of this article. See, e.g.,
Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Wake-Up Call from the Plea-Bargaining Trenches, 19 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 135, 144 (1994) ("Plea bargaining can be, and should be, abolished."); Easterbrook,
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decry the problems that inhere in a criminal justice system where,
although it may be where we might most aspire to the rule of law, we
have largely a rule of man instead.8
In keeping with a system of negotiated justice, a large body of legal
scholarship on plea bargaining has suggested that plea bargains are a
form of contract-a negotiated bargain between two parties-that takes
place in a specialized setting, but still shares many of the same features
of contract and contract negotiation, writ broadly.9 Economic theory
about bargaining has been one prominent framework guiding the
conversation about plea negotiation.0 The economic model of plea
bargaining relies on the availability and exchange of information that
provides the basis for assessment of probable outcomes." In the
economic model, parties are able to make assessments of probable trial
outcomes, compare them to potential plea agreements, and make a
rational choice about whether to accept or reject a plea agreement as
opposed to going to trial (defendant) or whether to offer a particular
plea bargain or go to trial (prosecutor).12
Plea Bargaining, supra note 4, at 1977 ("Plea bargaining is easier to justify today than ever
before."); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1407
(1970) ("The burdens which plea bargaining imposes on the exercise of constitutional trial
rights render the practice unconstitutional.").
8. See David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 115, 131 (1994) ("[T]he institution of plea bargaining has turned our
criminal courts into centers of hustling, more worthy of an open-air market than a
courthouse, and far distanced from the ideal versions of the rule or practice of law.").
9. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909 (1992).
10. See id.; Bar-Gill & Ayal, supra note 6; Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note
4.
11. It is not clear that all parties engaged in plea bargaining have access to all relevant
information. Defendants presumably have information about their participation or lack
thereof in particular criminal activity, although of course, there may be complex cases where
the legal posture makes it hard for a defendant to know if he or she engaged in prohibited
conduct. Prosecutors presumably begin their work by gathering information about the proof
available against a particular defendant, and defense attorneys presumably develop, over
time, information that comes from both defendant-clients and prosecutors. There is no
requirement that the individuals involved in the plea bargaining process exchange all relevant
information with one another. The defendant, of course, has no responsibility to provide his
or her information to anyone else; it might be prudent to divulge this information to defense
counsel, but certainly much of that information is unlikely to be provided to the prosecutor.
Prosecutors, on the other hand, are bound by law to provide certain materials about the proof
they or other law enforcement officials have gathered, but this is not always required prior to
plea bargaining. See Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must
Yield to New Realities, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 541, 558. The normative implications of imperfect
information and information asymmetries are beyond the scope of this essay, however.
12. So, for example, Grossman and Katz make the "basic assumption ... that both the
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Psychology research in the last three decades has devoted a good
deal of attention to an examination of how individuals process
information. One of the most influential approaches, pioneered by
Kahneman and Tversky, has identified significant ways in which human
behavior deviates from prediction because of cognitive biases and
heuristics in processing data. 3 The implications of cognitive biases and
heuristics have been explored in a vast number of socio-legal settings,
including plea bargaining, " to challenge the assumption that individuals
can properly assess the likelihood of various outcomes so that they can
make the utility-maximizing choice among those outcomes. However,
some scholars have suggested that lawyers may be in a good position to
better approximate the rational actor than their clients, and that, in the
plea bargaining context, lawyers may be effective debiasers. 5
In this essay, I take a broader tack to suggest why the rational actor
paradigm in plea bargaining may not capture the reality of the
negotiation between prosecutor and defense counsel, and why lawyers
may not be likely to lessen the effects of cognitive bias and heuristics.
Cognitive biases and heuristics that interfere with accurate information
processing are certainly one threat to a rational economic model of plea
bargaining. But modern psychology has recognized that cognitive biases
and heuristics do not exist in a vacuum and are not the only systematic
predictors of how individuals process information. An exclusive focus
on cognitive biases and heuristics, indeed, suggests a "but for"
mentality-but for the psychological "quirks" of cognitive bias,
individuals could be rational, utility-maximizing actors. However,
research in social psychology offers a different picture: rather than
suggesting that certain factors act as an impediment to rational decision
making, the social psychological approach seeks to explain perception
and decision making as a function of myriad individual and social
factors. An individual with complex motives is embedded in a complex
social landscape, and both motivational and social factors have strong
effects on information processing and perception of processed
defendant and the prosecutor behave rationally, in the sense that each acts to maximize an
appropriately defined utility function." Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea
Bargaining and Social Welfare, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 749, 750 (1983).
13. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL.
REV. 237 (1973).
14. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463 (2004); Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L.
REV. 205; Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006).
15. See Bibas, supra note 14, at 2527.
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information.
This essay begins to explore psychological research on how
motivation and the effects of social factors can affect information
processing to shed light on such processing in the plea bargaining
setting. In particular, I consider the effects of two factors, epistemic
motivation and group identity and membership, on information
processing as it may relate to plea negotiation. I begin by briefly
reviewing the literature on how cognitive bias may affect plea
bargaining. I then explore how epistemic motivation and group identity
and membership affect information processing and the use of biases and
heuristics more broadly, looking particularly at potential effects in the
plea bargaining setting.
II. COGNITIVE BIASES AND HEURISTICS IN PLEA BARGAINING
A. Cognitive Bias and the Rational Actor Model
In the field of legal negotiation, economic theory tells us that with
complete information, rational parties will always prefer to reach a
negotiated agreement rather than proceed to trial.16 So, too, economic
theory predicts that with complete information, a rational prosecutor
and rational defendant will always prefer to reach an agreement than go
to trial.17 The rational actor has been a stock figure that law and
economics scholars have relied on for years to make predictions about
human decision making in the legal context. The rational actor model
presupposes that an individual can accurately perceive the information
that is essential to making an assessment about the utility of various
options. Once this information has been accurately processed, and
utility properly assessed, it is easy to make a choice that will maximize
utility.
Two main features of the real world cause this not to happen: first,
individuals rarely have access to complete information, 8 and second,
16. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 567 (6th ed. 2003).
17. For a guilty defendant, a plea agreement would be the rational outcome; if we
assume complete information, we need not concern ourselves with the innocent defendant.
The enormous scholarly debate about the problem of the innocent defendant is outside the
scope of this article. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 5, at 1981; Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE
L.J. 2011, 2013 (1992). The social psychological research on information processing that I am
discussing is not dependent on an assumption of guilt or innocence.
18. Issues about the asymmetry of information in criminal proceedings are, of course,
critical to an understanding of the plea bargaining process in actual practice, see, e.g.,
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individuals are not information processing "machines" that perceive
information neutrally and accurately. In recent years, law and
economics has incorporated social science insights to develop the field
of behavioral law and economics, which considers the impact of how
individuals actually behave. And so the rational actor model of law and
economics has been supplemented by what I call the irrational actor
model-the model of a rational actor led astray by certain predictable
and observable cognitive biases-and what some call "psychological
quirks and irrationalities." 9 Behavioral law and economics reflects the
long-held beliefs of social psychologists that human behavior is complex
and deviates systematically from predictions based on an economic
model.
Research on the deviations from the rational actor model proves
useful in thinking about decision making because it provides more
realistic models of how individuals are likely to make decisions than the
economic model. So, for instance, in thinking about why individuals
might choose a particular settlement offer versus pursuing an
adjudicated outcome, research on cognitive biases and heuristics help to
make sense of seemingly "irrational" decisions to proceed with a course
of action whose expected utility is not-and here, as always, we must
presume some objective reality-as good as the expected utility of the
rejected course of action.
It is not always clear in which direction irrationality takes us. The
most prominent treatment has been given to the ways in which
"deviations from rationality" produce "suboptimality" in negotiated
outcomes." And the literature typically suggests that the most likely
case of suboptimality is when individuals refuse to accept settlements
that are in fact better than the alternative course of action.2 But
Kahneman and Tversky offer the wise counsel that "[i]t would be
inappropriate to conclude . . .that departures from rationality always
inhibit the resolution of conflict," pointing out that "[tihere are many
situations in which less-than-rational agents may reach agreement while
POSNER, supra note 16, at 549, but are not a crucial element of the project I am undertaking
here.
19. Bibas, supra note 14, at 2469.
20. MARGARET A. NEALE & MAX H. BAZERMAN, COGNITION AND RATIONALITY IN
NEGOTIATION 170 (1991).
21. Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction to BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 3, 10 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995). ("[Plarties are subject to
psychological processes that render them unable to recognize as advantageous (or unwilling
to accept despite their advantages) settlement terms that seemingly meet the requirements of
rational self-interest.").
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perfectly rational agents do not."22
In plea bargaining, the insights from cognitive research have helped
to amplify and deepen the economic model of plea bargaining.23 In plea
bargaining, in order for a rational agreement to be reached by both
parties, the plea bargain must be no worse, and probably slightly better,
than the projected outcome at trial.24  In a world of complete
information, a negotiated outcome would always be reached because the
prosecutor and the defense attorney could calculate the probable
outcome at trial and reach an agreement that offered some-however
slight-discount in punishment to the defendant. One way of explaining
why this does not occur is to look to the ways in which cognitive biases
affect the processing of information so that individuals make inaccurate
assessments of probable outcomes and make inaccurate comparisons
between those assessments and the plea bargain offer.
In the plea bargaining field, then, there are two categories of
irrational cases from the defense perspective and two categories of
irrational cases from the prosecution perspective. From the defense
side, there are cases where a defendant accepts a plea bargain that is too
high in light of the probable trial outcome and cases where a defendant
refuses a plea bargain that is better than the probable trial outcome.
From the prosecution side, there are cases where a prosecutor offers a
deal that is worse than the probable outcome at trial or cases where a
prosecutor offers a deal that is much better-too much better-than the
probable outcome at trial.
Professor Stephanos Bibas has made an important contribution in
this area by exploring the relevance of several cognitive biases in
defendants' decisions about whether to accept a particular plea bargain
or reject it in favor of proceeding to trial.25 Professor Alafair Burke,
likewise, has described the ways in which cognitive bias may affect
prosecutorial decision making.26 And these are terribly useful insights:
22. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 45, 45-46 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al eds., 1995).
23. See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 4; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 9, at
1920.
24. 1 leave aside, for the purposes of this discussion, the complex issues surrounding the
existence and assessment of a "trial tax"-what some have described as the extra punishment
a defendant may face merely by virtue of exercising his right to trial. See, e.g., STEVE
BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN CRIMINAL
COURTHOUSE 38 (2005).
25. Bibas, supra note 14, at 2496-2519.
26. Burke, supra note 14; Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and
Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, Prosecutorial Passion].
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the paradigm of the rational decision maker who compares the deal on
the table to the potential outcome at trial27 and coolly chooses the
alternative that has the greatest utility is, simply put, often wrong, both
within and beyond the context of plea bargaining. Research on human
behavior reveals that individuals are not that good, first, at making the
assessment about the potential outcome at trial, and second, at making
an effective comparison between the two choices."
From prospect theory and behavioral decision theory have come
some of the most influential findings about individuals' decision-making
processes. Kahneman and Tversky showed that people are typically loss
averse, which means that they are more worried about losing than they
are happy about gaining. 9 This means that a graph of utility is not a
straight line with a constant slope; instead, the classic utility graph of
prospect theory shows that the utility line curves, so that as one's loss
increases, one's utility decreases disproportionately more, and as one's
gain increases, one's utility increases disproportionately less. So, too,
framing the same facts in different terms, either as a gain or as a loss,
has significant effects on how people perceive those facts. This means
that the same outcomes are processed differently if they are coded as
losses versus gains, meaning that parties will make different decisions
when they consider what are, mathematically, the same options."
27. For a discussion of how prosecutors and defense attorneys perceive these
calculations (often called BATNA, or "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" in the
negotiation literature), see Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Note, Getting to "Guilty": Plea
Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 121-25 (1997).
28. It is interesting that the predictions one might make based on the cognitive biases
and heuristics research suggest that parties might systematically but irrationally fail to reach
agreement. See Bibas, supra note 14, at 2519; Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship
Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L.REV. 213,215-16 (2007). Of
course, because the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved by plea, there is a question
about how powerful these cognitive biases are in the plea bargaining setting. Covey has
suggested that the structural features of the criminal justice system are designed to induce
defendants to plead guilty, regardless of the directionality of the cognitive bias. Id. at 223.
29. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 342 (1984).
30. Consider the classic Asian disease experiment. Participants were presented with one
of two pairs of mathematically identical options in the face of a deadly disease: the first pair
was a choice between (A) 200 people will be saved and (B) one-third probability that all will
be saved and two-thirds probability that no one will be saved; the second pair was a choice
between (C) 400 people will die and (D) one-third probability that no one will die and two-
third probability that all will die. Despite the fact that A and B are mathematically identical
to each other in terros of their expected value, as well as mathematically identical to the
options presented by C and D, participants overwhelmingly chose A in the first pair but D in
the second pair, which is contrary to the predictions of utility theory in economics, which
posits that individuals will always choose the option with greater utility regardless of the
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Behavioral decision theory has identified other cognitive biases and
heuristics that can play an important role in individuals' assessments of
valuation and of the utility of their various choices, such as anchoring
and adjustment, availability, and overconfidence.
Professors Bibas, Burke, Birke, and Covey have examined the ways
these heuristics and biases may alter the assessment of trial outcome
from both the prosecution and defense sides.3 Time discounting may
work to make defendants devalue consequences occurring far in the
future, making defendants more indifferent to additional years on the
tail end of a sentence.32 Optimistic overconfidence is likely to skew
perceptions of alternatives on both sides, such that both sides inflate
their chances of success at trial 3  Selective perception similarly makes
individuals less open to disconfirming information that might exist.'
Risk preferences, too, may alter the calculus of plea bargaining-many
defendants have probably already demonstrated their risk preference
(that is, risk-seeking) through their criminal behavior; others may have
competing risk preferences that make them more averse to risk.
Anchoring, a robust effect throughout the psychological literature, gives
strong effect to the first offer put on the table, and as Professor Burke
has suggested, cases involving strong prosecutorial emotion are likely to
involve extreme first offers by prosecutors.35
B. Biased Information Processing in a Broader Context
These cognitive biases and heuristics can be situated in the broader
field of social psychology by thinking about them as one form of
automatic versus effortful information processing. "Dual process"
theories in psychology suggest that people process information one of
two ways: either through "mental shortcuts" that process information
quickly and automatically, without much cognitive effort, or through
careful, effortful, and cognitively laborious review of relevant data.36
frame in which it is presented. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
31. See Bibas, supra note 14, 2498-2519; Birke, supra note 14, at 219-225; Burke, supra
note 14, at 1605-09; Covey, supra note 28, at 216-223.
32. See Bibas, supra note 14, at 2504.
33. See id. at 2498.
34. See id.; Burke, supra note 14, at 1596, 1603.
35. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, supra note 26, at 204.
36. Marilynn B. Brewer, A Dual Process Model of Impression Formation, in 1
ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 4-5 (Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr. eds., 1988);
see, e.g., John A. Bargh, Attention and Automaticity in the Processing of Self-Relevant
Information, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 425, 426 (1982).
[91:163
2007] SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PLEA BARGAINING 171
The broadest form of mental shortcut is a schema,37 an organizational
structure for knowledge and information. Schemas guide the way that
new information is processed and also guide the way that information is
selectively retrieved from memory.38 Schemas can relate to anything-
others, the self, events, objects, relationships. Schematic information
processing is the broadest kind of automatic processing; one might think
of cognitive biases and heuristics as a subset of narrow, specific,
schematic and automatic information processing.
Individuals engage in automatic information processing rather than
effortful information processing much of the time. We take these
shortcuts because, as one psychologist explains in the context of meeting
new people, "[t]aking the time to assess each new person in his or her
full complexity is simply too taxing of mental resources to allow us to
perform other tasks."3 9 In a world that consists of astronomical bits of
data, humans are "cognitive misers" who save their effortful processing
for only a few tasks.40
The use of automatic rather than effortful processing has the
potential to affect plea negotiation more broadly than just in the ways
that cognitive bias and heuristics might. Automatic processing means
that information is processed in light of an existing theory of the world,
while effortful processing means that information is processed more
"neutrally" and then forms the basis of a judgment or theory about the
world.41 Thus perceptual models of situations can drive the way in which
information is processed. And, in turn, the way that information is
processed according to a particular perceptual model can affect
behavior. For instance, people behave very differently in negotiations
when they are labeled the "Wall Street Game" versus the "Community
Game. 42 So, then, information that is processed in a negotiation that is
quite self-consciously labeled "criminal justice" might likely be
perceived as more adversarial, and thus produce, in turn, more
adversarial behavior and more polarized outcomes, than a negotiation
37. Susan T. Fiske & Patricia W. Linville, What Does the Schema Concept Buy Us?, 6
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 543, 543 (1980).
38. Id.
39. GORDON B. MOSKOWITZ, SOCIAL COGNITION: UNDERSTANDING SELF AND
OTHERS 174 (2005).
40. Susan T. Fiske, Social Cognition, in ADVANCED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 149, 153
(Abraham Tesser ed., 1995).
41. Moskowitz, supra note 39, at 201-02.
42. Varda Liberman et al., The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations
Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner's Dilemma Game Moves, 30 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1175, 1176-77 (2004).
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that does not have that label.
Negotiators use different perceptual "frames"43 for negotiation that
affect the ways in which they process information and then behave. For
example, Pinkley identified three distinct categories of frames that had
an effect on negotiation outcomes: task versus relationship, emotional
versus intellectual, and cooperation versus win.' She found that when
negotiators adopted a task frame rather than a relationship frame, they
got better numerical outcomes." When they viewed the negotiation as
emotional rather than intellectual, they made more apologies and talked
more about negative feelings. 6 And finally, when negotiators viewed
negotiation through a perceptual frame of cooperation rather than win,
they had better outcomes as well.47
In the plea bargaining setting, the use of automatic processing-or
theory-driven, rather than data-driven, information processing-might
mean that if defendants, defense counsel, and prosecutors begin with
pre-formed, possibly ideological theories of guilt and innocence, and
pre-formed theories about the kind of behavior that will occur during
the negotiation (adversarial versus cooperative, for example), they are
likely to end up with different negotiations, and different negotiation
outcomes, than negotiations in which the parties process new
information without relying on these perceptual frames.
Because the economic model of plea bargaining depends on rational
information processing, the extent to which real plea bargaining may
deviate from this model is important in understanding whether the legal
literature that relies on this model is useful. Professors Bibas, Burke,
and Birke have suggested that the economic model does not fully
capture the reality of plea bargaining because of what these cognitive
biases and heuristics tell us about how people really process
information. However, the literature still regards the rational economic
model as the ultimate best goal.
To that end, Professors Bibas' and Covey,49 among others, have
suggested that defense lawyers may be in a good position to act as
43. Note that these are distinct from the frames identified in prospect theory, above.
44. Robin L. Pinkley, Dimensions of Conflict Frame: Disputant Interpretations of
Conflict, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 117, 121-22 (1990).
45. Id. at 119-21.
46. Id. at 120-21.
47. Id.
48. See Bibas, supra note 14, at 2527.
49. Covey, supra note 28, at 235.
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debiasers for their clients. 0 Specifically, Professor Bibas has suggested
that, in the plea bargaining context, attorneys might be good debiasers-
individuals whose expertise and agency put them in a good position to
engage in the effortful processing that could counteract the biases and
heuristics that defendants are likely to use." Although Professor Bibas
acknowledges that lawyers are human too, he has optimism about the
professional expertise that lawyers may bring to bear in curbing some of
the more egregious biases that defendants may bring to the table. 2
Indeed, some research does suggest that lawyers may be less susceptible
to certain biases, such as framing.5' And other research suggests, in a
more attenuated way, that lawyers might be able to learn from their past
experience and formulate more realistic views of potential outcomes. 4
But other research suggests that attorneys are not systematically free
from bias.55 Indeed, there is no body of social science research that
suggests that attorneys are free from cognitive bias and heuristic
processing. Even researchers who report findings that support the
hypothesis that "lawyers are likely to be more inclined than their clients
to adhere to the principles of expected financial value analysis"
acknowledge in the same breath that "everyone's decisions are affected
by psychological phenomena and aided by heuristics.
5 6
In the next part of this essay, I suggest that relying on lawyers as
primary debiasers in the plea negotiation context, with an expectation
that this behavior will bring plea bargaining more in line with the
economic model of plea bargaining, may not be an approach that social
science data warrants. As noted above, the data about the degree to
which lawyers are bias-free analysts is not conclusive; more importantly,
though, defense attorneys and prosecutors do not exist in a vacuum.
50. Bibas asserts, "Lawyers, though they suffer from many of the same biases, may be
less susceptible to a number of them. Lawyers can therefore at least moderate some of these
biases." Bibas, supra note 14, at 2520.
51. Id. at 2521.
52. Id.
53. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A
New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76TEX. L. REV. 77, 96-101 (1997).
54. See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 157 (1993); Frank P. McKenna & Ian P. Albery, Does
Unrealistic Optimism Change Following a Negative Experience?, 31 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1146,1155 (2001).
55. Even Korobkin and Guthrie are unable to claim statistically significant results for
their test of whether lawyer and litigant subjects differed in the degree to which they were
affected by anchoring. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 53, at 107.
56. Id. at 135.
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Data suggests that the use of automatic information processing,
including biases and heuristics, can be affected by both situational and
individual dispositional features that, I posit, are likely to be present in
the plea bargaining setting and to exacerbate or encourage the use of
such biases.
Because there is no empirical data on the way that the particular
factors I consider below actually affect the behavior of prosecutors and
defense attorneys in the plea bargaining setting, what follows are
hypotheses that prior literature supports, but that no data has verified.
It is not my project here to definitively state that lawyers cannot be
debiasers, or that lawyers are, indeed, biased in the particular ways that
I suggest. Rather, in light of social science data about how individuals
process information, and in light of what we know about our criminal
justice system and its prosecutors and defense attorneys, I offer some
hypotheses about the way that lawyers are likely to behave in the plea
bargaining setting and suggest that their behavior may not be likely to
reflect the rational actor paradigm.
III. Two FACTORS THAT MAY INCREASE RELIANCE
ON COGNITIVE BIAS
The cognitive biases discussed above do not function mechanically
and systematically in every decision making and negotiation setting.
Rather, the role of bias and the use of heuristics and mental shortcuts in
information processing are lessened in some settings and increased in
other settings. In this section I describe some of the research on two
motivational and situational factors that can alter individuals' manner of
information processing and decision making and begin the work of
mapping these factors onto the plea bargaining setting. I suggest that
the features of the plea bargaining system are likely to increase rather
than decrease reliance on these shortcuts.
A. Epistemic Motivation
Psychological literature has identified "epistemic motivation" as the
need to acquire and process information systematically. Epistemic
motivation is the degree to which individuals need more or less
information when making decisions; conversely, epistemic motivation's
flip side is "need for closure." Individuals who need more information
before making decisions are considered high in epistemic motivation
and low in the need for cognitive closure; individuals who are
comfortable making quicker decisions using less information are
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considered low in epistemic motivation and high in the need for
cognitive closure.
Psychologist Arie Kruglanski pioneered lay epistemic theory, which
suggests that epistemic motivation and the need for cognitive closure
affect not just the amount of information that is needed, but also how
relevant information is processed. Research by Kruglanski and others
has shown that individuals with a higher need for cognitive closure are
more likely to rely on heuristics and stereotypes in processing
information;57 this is faster than systematic information processing and
therefore speeds the time in which cognitive closure occurs. 8
Differences in individuals' epistemic motivation and need for closure
stem both from situational factors and individual differences in
personality. With respect to individual differences, studies have shown
that a high need for closure is associated with a desire for predictability,
a preference for order and structure, discomfort with ambiguity,
decisiveness, and close-mindedness. 9 Research on lawyer personality
suggests that lawyers generally tend to score high on personality
measures that correlate with a desire for "structure, schedules, closure
on decisions, planning, follow through, and a 'cut-to-the-chase'
approach."6 And it may be that those who are drawn to the criminal
justice system are particularly interested in or oriented towards closure:
after all, they have taken jobs (especially prosecutors) that are driven by
the need for resolution-the closure-of criminal cases.
Situational factors may also increase individuals' need for closure.
Epistemic motivation can decrease when individuals are under time
pressure61 or conditions of mental fatigue.62 "Of the many variables that
57. See Arie W. Kruglanski & Donna M. Webster, Motivated Closing of the Mind:
"Seizing" and "Freezing," 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 263, 265 (1996); Carsten K.W. De Dreu et al.,
On the Seizing and Freezing of Negotiator Inferences: Need for Cognitive Closure Moderates
the Use of Heuristics in Negotiation, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 348, 348
(1999).
58. See Kruglanski & Webster, supra note 57, at 265.
59. See Donna M. Webster & Arie W. Kruglanski, Individual Differences in Need for
Cognitive Closure, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1049 (1994).
60. SUSAN SWAIM DAICOFF, LAWYER, KNOW THYSELF: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS OF PERSONALITY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 33 (2004).
61. Carsten K.W. De Dreu, Time Pressure and Closing of the Mind in Negotiation, 91
ORG. BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 280, 281 (2003); Tallie Freund et al., The
Freezing and Unfreezing of Impressional Primacy: Effects of the Need for Structure and the
Fear of Invalidity, 11 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 479,486 (1985).
62. Donna M. Webster et al., On Leaping to Conclusions When Feeling Tired: Mental
Fatigue Effects on Impressional Primacy, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 191
(1996).
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affect epistemic motivation, time pressure is one of the most well-
known."63 Findings in psychology "strongly suggest that negotiators are
less likely to engage in systematic information processing when there is
high rather than low time pressure."" In contrast, high epistemic
6'motivation can decrease the use of stereotypes and heuristics and
reduce the selective use of information,6 as well as increase the
tendency to engage in systematic information processing.
In one negotiation study about the effects of epistemic motivation
and the need for closure, De Dreu asked participants to negotiate under
one of two conditions, one of which was meant to provide the
perception of high time pressure and one of which was meant to provide
the perception of low time pressure.67 In this setting, De Dreu found
that participants who felt that they were under high time pressure were
more likely to base their judgments and decisions about their
negotiation behavior on stereotypes and cognitive heuristics. Because
"stereotypic cues were not used at all when time pressure was low," '
individuals processed information more carefully and systematically in a
low time pressure setting.
Prosecutors and defense attorneys are generally under a great deal
of time pressure, in light of overloaded dockets and institutional
pressures. 69 Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and defendants all are in a
setting where time pressure is an issue: prosecutors operate under a
speedy trial clock in many jurisdictions, and defense lawyers, especially
those whose clients are incarcerated or who have an indictment hanging
63. Gerben A. Van Kleef et al., The Interpersonal Effects of Emotions in Negotiations: A
Motivated Information Processing Approach, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 516
(2004).
64. Id.
65. See De Dreu, supra note 61, at 281; De Dreu et al., supra note 57, at 358; Susan T.
Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, from Category-Based to
Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention and
Interpretation, in 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOLGY I (Mark P.
Zanna ed., 1990); Arie W. Kruglanski & Tallie Freund, The Freezing and Unfreezing of Lay-
Inferences: Effects on Impressional Primacy, Ethnic Stereotyping, and Numerical Anchoring,
19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 448 (1983).
66. Alice F. Stuhimacher & Matthew V. Champagne, The Impact of Time Pressure and
Information on Negotiation Process and Decisions, 9 GROUP DECISION & NEGOTIATION 471
(2000).
67. De Dreu, supra note 61, at 284-85.
68. Id. at 285.
69. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 682-83 (2007).
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over them, may be eager to get charges resolved."
All of these factors taken together suggest that plea bargaining
places individuals who are already likely to have a high need for closure
in a setting that will exacerbate this need and decrease epistemic
motivation. Research suggests that this, in turn, is likely to lead to
greater reliance on heuristics and biases in information processing and
decision making, rather than the more effortful and cognitively
laborious information processing that is more consistent with the
rational actor model.
B. Group Identity and Group Membership
1. Group Definition
The cognitive bias and heuristics literature meshes well with the
rational actor paradigm in that both view information processing as a
solitary act, pursued by a human mind that works, on its own terms,
disengaged from a greater social reality. And, indeed, social psychology
for many years did not consider the role of the group as an explanatory
concept for human behavior." Instead, the notion that group behavior,
or the behavior of individuals within an identifiable group, might differ
from the behavior of individuals was controversial, and the study of
groups, intergroup behavior, the formation of groups, and the behavior
of individuals within groups was almost nonexistent. 2
In the second half of the twentieth century, however, social
psychologists made remarkable discoveries about how important group
identification is to people, even when they are acting individually.
Groups and group identification play a powerful role in how people
perceive and make sense of the world around them. The development
of the terminology of ingroup and outgroup to refer to one's own group
and some other group reflects the discovery in social psychology that
even the most minimal of distinctions can be seized on to formulate
group identities that, in turn, guide the ways in which people see the
world and then, in turn, act towards others.
73
Groups may or may not be defined by outward nomenclature or
constraints, but "the psychological reality of the group stems from
70. Id. at 679.
71. See, e.g., FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 4 (1924).
72. Id.
73. See Henri Tajfel, Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 1, 23-24 (1982).
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people's common perceptions of themselves as members of the same
social unit., 74  According to a definition by psychologist Sherif, a
pioneer in the study of groups, "[wlhenever individuals belonging to one
group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its
members in terms of their group identification, we have an instance of
intergroup behavior.
7 5
As an initial matter, of course, criminal defense lawyers and
prosecutors are situated within an adversary system that makes the
nature of the two groups distinct and oppositional. Even beyond that,
however, a brief survey of some of the more ethnographic literature
about prosecutors and defense attorneys suggests that the defense and
prosecution bar perceive themselves and one another as members of a
clearly defined ingroup and outgroup. For example, professor and
criminal defense attorney Abbe Smith eloquently describes the group
dimension of criminal defense lawyers:
Camaraderie undoubtedly plays an important role in
drawing and sustaining defenders....
... Many defenders report that the best part of the
work is the feeling of community and shared purpose, of
being in this together, of esprit de corps .... [One] career
defender [says]: "There's something special about us and
we're different from others-certainly other lawyers.
There's this kinship among us. You can't put a price tag
on that." There is an understanding that defenders had
better stick together, because pretty much everyone else
is against them.
The culture of public defender offices is one of mutual
support, collegiality, and generosity. Defenders "attend
each other's closing arguments, cross-examine one
another's clients, handle court appearances for
colleagues, commiserate, shoot the bull, and nibble at
each other's food." If time allowed, defenders would do
anything for their colleagues.
Camaraderie helps brace defenders for hostility from
the rest of society .... As career defender Stu Glovin
notes, "The camaraderie is almost like a sanctuary
74. 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 555 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1998).
75. Id.
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around here.,
76
Prosecutors, similarly, may identify strongly with a group identity.
Gary Lowenthal suggests, in his account of life as both a former
prosecutor and defense attorney, that there exists a divide between
prosecutors and defense attorneys: "[t]here was a strong taboo against
socializing with the enemy."' 7  His own experience led him to believe
that "many prosecutors see the world divided between 'us and everyone
else. , , ,78
In thinking about groups, there are always many levels upon which
categorization can be made, and there may indeed be superordinate
classifications that include both groups, such as "criminal justice
lawyers," or subordinate classifications within each group, such as
"public defender" or "white-collar criminal lawyer," that may affect
individual behavior. Nonetheless, it seems clear that prosecutors and
defense attorneys tend to have strong identification with their "side" of
the bar, and there are strong and salient cues that are likely to enhance
the view that these groups are oppositional to one another.79 In the
following section, I consider the potential effects of this group
categorization on information processing in the plea bargaining context.
2. Effects of Group Categorization
Individuals who identify with an ingroup are more likely to process
behavior and information from outgroup members using stereotypic and
biased judgments. They are more likely to rely on heuristic-driven
information processing than effortful, data-driven processing. Generally
speaking, the broadest form of bias in groups is bias towards the
members of the ingroup and against the members of the outgroup.
Individuals in the ingroup are seen as multidimensional, while
individuals in the outgroup are viewed as homogeneous. Members of
outgroups are seen less as individuals and more as anonymous group
members, while members of ingroups are viewed as more complex,
differentiated, and individualistic.
76. Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured
Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1213-15 (2004)
(citations omitted); see also MICHAEL SCOTT WEISS, PUBLIC DEFENDERS: PRAGMATIC AND
POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS TO REPRESENT THE INDIGENT 197 (2005) ("[M]any public
defenders seem as indisposed to prosecutors as they are to the police.").
77. GARY T. LOWENTHAL, DOWN AND DIRTY JUSTICE 107 (2003).
78. Id. at 288.
79. Defendants themselves, of course, constitute another group that plays an important
role in these negotiations.
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A similarly broad bias stemming from ingroup/outgroup distinction
is a group version of the "fundamental attribution error"-in
psychology, a robust finding that an individual sees negative actions by
herself and positive actions by others as highly dependent on the
situation, but sees positive actions by herself and negative actions by
others as reflective of some innate dispositional quality.' The group
version, sometimes called the "ultimate attribution error,"" is that
ingroup members make situational attributions for negative behaviors
engaged in by their own members and positive behaviors engaged in by
the members of the outgroup, but make dispositional attributions for
the positive behaviors engaged in by their own members and the
negative behaviors engaged in by the members of the outgroup.
More specifically, group membership and identity with a group has
been found to increase biased information processing in a host of
settings, mainly through the use of stereotypes. Stereotypes act as a
filter through which we process information and then encode it in, and
retrieve it from, memory.' Group membership and stereotypes about
outgroups can guide the way that information is processed so that the
same information is understood differently depending on the group
identities of the source of the information and the recipient of the
information. In one famous study, Hastorf and Cantril asked Princeton
and Dartmouth students to watch a football game between those schools
and assess who was responsible for the rough behavior, as well as tally
the number of rule infractions made by each team.83 The individuals in
each group reported dramatically different results, all of which
comported with a favorable assessment of their own group members'
behavior and a negative assessment of the other group members'
behavior."'
Similarly, Darley and Gross asked subjects to assess the academic
performance of an elementary school student, giving each subject
80. Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the
Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173, 183
(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977).
81. Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport's Cognitive
Analysis of Prejudice, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 461 (1979).
82. Information that matches stereotypes is remembered more than less-matching
information. See, e.g., Galen V. Bodenhausen & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Effects of Stereotypes on
Decision Making and Information-Processing Strategies, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 267 (1985).
83. Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129,130 (1954).
84. Id.
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information about the socio-economic status of the student's family.
8 5
Although the student's performance was identical, subjects who thought
that the student was from a high socio-economic background
consistently assessed the student as performing better than those who
thought the student was from a low socio-economic background.'
Darley and Gross suggested that stereotypes create hypotheses of how
people will behave, and then those hypotheses are tested on actual
behavior in a biased way.87
In plea bargaining, stereotypic processing based on group
membership in the defense or the prosecution camp suggests that there
would be a heightened perception of information received from the
other side in a way consistent with stereotypes and stereotypic
hypotheses. Alafair Burke has explored this idea, suggesting that
prosecutors who are sometimes later viewed as overzealous are not
unethical or bad people, but are just blinded by selective perception and
optimistic overconfidence because they filter potential information
about defendant innocence through a stereotypic lens that defendants,
as a group, are guilty.88
In light of the strong institutional group identity of the prosecutor
and the defense attorney, and in light of social science data on the way
in which group identity affects information processing, lawyers may not
be paradigms of rational actors in the plea bargaining context. Because
prosecutors and defense attorneys are not unaffiliated individuals who
come to each case without any preconceived notions about the
motivation and factual basis for the other party's behavior, but instead
are members of well-defined groups who are likely to have well-formed
stereotypes, or hypotheses, about the other group's behavior, they are
more likely to process information in a biased manner that is likely to
confirm their stereotypes about the other group. Especially in plea
bargaining, where there is no neutral third party who can make more
objective assessments, this biased information processing is likely to play
an important role in determining the negotiation outcome.
IV. CONCLUSION
What better place than our system of negotiated justice to use the
85. John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling
Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20,23 (1983).
86. Id. at 27.
87. Id. at 28.
88. Burke, supra note 14, at 1603.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
insights of psychological research on human behavior to help us gain a
better understanding of how the resolution of criminal cases both does,
and should, work? The groundbreaking work of Kahneman and
Tversky on cognitive bias and heuristic processing has begun to make a
dent in the economic model of plea bargaining,' suggesting that a
rational decision-making picture of plea negotiation may not reflect
reality. But relying on prosecutors and defense attorneys to put the
rational back in rational decision making may be a misguided effort.
Cognitive biases and heuristics are part of a broader class of social
psychological decision making and information processing theories,
which suggest that individuals sometimes engage in effortful processing
and at other times rely on more automatic processing. Here, I have
posited that some features of our criminal justice system may make it
more, rather than less, likely that lawyers will engage in automatic,
biased, and heuristics-based information processing.
Much more work remains to be done on the psychology of human
behavior in plea bargaining. Especially in light of the advances in
psychological research on negotiation in recent years, plea bargaining
and psychological research on negotiation make a particularly choice
pairing. The rich literature on biases and heuristics is a tremendous
resource for those studying negotiation between a prosecutor and a
defense attorney. But it is not the only resource that social psychology
has to offer that sheds light on the question of how people behave in the
plea bargaining context. In the negotiation context, for example,
researchers in recent years have begun to make great inroads in
understanding the role of emotion in negotiation.' Outside of the
negotiation context, per se, other insights from social psychology may
prove useful. For example, research on the psychology of procedural
justice may indicate that perceptions of the fairness of process play an
important role in shaping perceptions about the legitimacy of plea
bargaining.91 As we think critically about our system of negotiated
justice, understanding more about the contours of the human behavior
that comprises that system can only amplify our comprehension.
89. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 13.
90. See, e.g., Van Kleef et al., supra note 63.
91. For an exploration of this idea, see Michael O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural
Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
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